Statute- of-Limitations Instruction
The Government prosecuted Jack Pursley for an intricate tax-fraud scheme involving various offshore accounts, a myriad of transactions, and millions in untaxed funds. Pursley raised a statute-of-limitations defense several times in motions to dismiss and proposed jury charges, but the district court repeatedly rejected it. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding Pursley was deprived of a valid defense. He was entitled to have it considered and to have the jury instructed on it.
A grand jury began investigating Pursley for his part in a tax-fraud scheme. The scheme involved the use of various offshore accounts, including some in the Isle of Man. The U.S. Government sent the Isle of Man several requests for assistance in the investigation. The Isle of Man cooperated and began sending the requested documentation over. It appeared to the U.S. Government that the Isle of Man was not cooperating completely, os it moved for suspension of the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. 3292, which allows for a suspension of the limitations period when the Government is seeking evidence from a foreign country. A district judge granted the suspension, but his order did not specify the length of the suspension.
The grand jury later returned a four-count indictment against Pursley, charging him with conspiracy to defraud the United States and tax evasion.
Pursley moved to dismiss all counts as barred by the statute of limitations. The Government opposed the motion, relying on its ex parte suspension of limitations. The district court denied Pursley’s motion without comment. At a pretrial hearing, the district court opined that it could rely on the other judge’s order and therefore deny the limitations defense.
Pursley was tried, and proposed a jury instruction that read: “For you to find the defendant guilty, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense charged was committed within 6 years of the indictment.” The Government objected to the request because it failed to account for tolling under 18 U.S.C. 3292. The district court denied Pursley’s instruction.
The Fifth Circuit said it was necessary to determine exactly when the statute of limitations commenced and ran to determine the merit of Pursley’s statute of limitations defense. The statute of limitations was six years without accounting for any tolling. The parties agreed that there was at least some suspension of limitations, but disagreed about how long it lasted.
18 U.S.C. 3292(a)(1) states that the period of suspension begins on the date when the official request is made and ends when the foreign court or authority takes final action on the request. The statute also limits the length of time the limitations period may be suspended. The parties disputed whether the Isle of Man took “final action.” If so, the total suspension was six months. If not, the suspension lasted through the date of indictment.
The Court, relying on previous precedent, said that “final action” turns on whether a dispositive response to an official request for evidence from the U.S. Government has been obtained. In other words, when the foreign government believes it has completed its engagement and communicates that belief to our government, that foreign government has taken a “final action” for purposes of the statute.
Looking at the Isle of Man’s response, the Court concluded that whether it had taken a “final action” was a fact-bound question. It said that such a fact-bound question was in the clear province of the district court. The court’s analysis of Pursley’s proposed jury question was the same. The district court needed to make a determination of the length of the suspension, and incorporate that into a proper jury question.