SCOTUS Cabins the Reach of Identity Theft
David Dubin helped his father manage a psychological services company. This company submitted a claim for reimbursement to Medicaid for psychological testing by a licensed psychologist. The claim overstated the qualifications of the employee who conducted the test who was only a licensed psychological associate. This falsehood inflated the amount of reimbursement. This was all about a $338 bill. Dubin was charged with healthcare fraud, a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The Government also claimed this conduct constituted aggravated identity theft under U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1).
The Government argued at Dubin’s trial that § 1028A(a)(1) was automatically satisfied because his fraudulent billing included the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number (a “means of identification”). Dubin was convicted, and appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, even after rehearing en banc.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court observed that the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the statute would apply “automatically any time a name or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or billing method used in the commission of a long list of predicate offenses. In other words, virtually all the time.” It rejected this interpretation by viewing “uses” and “in relation to” in context. It reasoned that a more targeted reading accurately captures the originally understanding of identity theft, where misuse of a means of identification is at the crux of the criminality. “In other words, the means of identification specifically is a key mover in the criminality,” the Court said. Ultimately, it held 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) is violated when the defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal rather than merely an ancillary feature of a billing method.